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In September 2007, the inaugural 
issue of Prescriptions for Excellence 
in Health Care painted the national 
quality landscape with broad strokes, 
dealing with issues such as culture 
change in medicine and quality 
initiatives at the state level.  In this 
issue, we narrow the focus to look at 
advances in patient safety and quality 
improvement in our nation’s hospitals.  
Improving patient safety continues 
to be an uphill battle on the hospital 
front.  In its 4th Annual Patient 
Safety in American Hospitals Study 
(April 2007), HealthGrades, an 
organization that provides ratings and 
profiles of hospitals, nursing homes, 
and physicians, analyzed patient 
safety among Medicare patients 
in all US hospitals.1  Looking at 
data from 2003-2005, they found 
that despite increased attention to 
improving quality and patient safety, 
approximately 1.16 million total patient 
safety incidents occurred in the course 
of over 40 million hospitalizations.  
These incidents were associated with 
$8.6 billion in excess costs.  Moreover, 
10 of 16 studied patient safety incident 
rates worsened by more than 11.5% on 
average; the 6 indicators that improved 
did so by 8% on average.  Perhaps the 
most disturbing finding was that of the 
284,798 deaths that occurred among 
patients who were affected by 1 or 
more patient safety incidents, 247,662 
(or 87%) were potentially preventable.
The 2006 Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
National Healthcare Quality Report 
assessing the state of hospital quality 
and patient safety2 was similarly 
dispiriting.  It concluded that positive 
change in quality outcomes has been 
modest and that variation in health care 
quality remains unacceptably high.
We have seen positive effects stemming 
from public reporting initiatives (eg, 
the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council [PHC4]),3 but 
the continued lack of any nationally
Prescriptions for Excellence in Health 
Care is brought to Health Policy 
Newsletter readers by the Department 
of Health Policy in partnership 
with Eli Lilly and Company to 
provide essential information 
from the quality improvement 
and patient safety arenas. 
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Editorial
Hospitals Take Ownership 
for Quality Improvement 
and Patient Safety
By David B. Nash, MD, MBA
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MRSA is a strengthening enemy. A 
minor health concern 50 years ago, it 
is a growing cause of morbidity and 
mortality in hospitals today.  The 
organism now affects at least 46 of 
every 1,000 patients in hospitals 
and nursing homes.1  Each year, 
MRSA infections are associated 
with billions of dollars in direct costs 
and thousands of patient deaths.  
Although basic procedures for 
preventing infection have existed 
for decades, too often health care 
professionals fail to adhere to 
them.  For example, we know that 
following Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) 
hand hygiene guidelines2 is one 
of the most effective means for 
avoiding the spread of MRSA, 
but fewer than 50% of health care 
workers follow the guidelines 
of washing hands before and 
after entering patients’ rooms.3     
Physician compliance is even lower.     
A typical institutional response to 
this type of issue is to target people 
whose behavior needs to change 
and tell them what they need 
to do differently.  Interventions 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) 
Eradication and Positive Deviance: Experience at 
Philadelphia’s Albert Einstein Medical Center
By Jeff Cohn, MD, MHCM
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recognized system or structure for 
identifying, reporting, and sharing 
quality and patient safety information 
remains a substantial barrier to 
improvement in these vital areas.    
In this issue, the authors describe 
successful quality improvement 
initiatives undertaken by 4 different 
hospitals:  an innovative approach 
to eradicating methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) at a 
Philadelphia medical center; a strong 
argument for redesigning hospital 
facilities in order to reduce human 
error, thereby preventing harm to 
patients; a comprehensive quality 
improvement plan involving an entire 
academic health center in western 
Massachusetts; and an intervention 
directed at decreasing turnaround 
time in a single department at 
a health system in Delaware.   
Upcoming issues will be devoted 
to such topics as improving the 
quality of care in outpatient settings 
and the role of health information 
technology and public reporting.  I 
hope that you will be as impressed as 
I am with the range and scope of the 
programs and initiatives described by 
the authors, as well as with the level 
of commitment represented by the 
work at their respective institutions.  
As always, I am interested in your 
feedback and you can reach me by 
email at david.nash@jefferson.edu. 
References:
1. HealthGrades. Fourth Annual Patient Safety in 
 American Hospitals Study. April 2007. Available at:  
 http://www.healthgrades.com/media/dms/pdf/ 
 PatientSafetyInAmericanHospitalsStudy2007.pdf.
2. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. National  
 Healthcare Quality Report (NHQR) 2006. Rockville,  
 MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2006.   
 Available at: http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hhqr06/nhqr06.htm.
3. Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council.  
 Hospital-Acquired Infections in Pennsylvania. November  
 14, 2005.  Available at: http://www.phc4.org/reports/ 
 hai/05/nr111406.htm.
Message from the
Lilly Hospital
Group Director
The Institute of Medicine 
reports of the past 15 years have 
revealed a range of opportunities 
for improvement in quality and 
safety in health care.  In response 
to these reports, health care 
organizations and their leaders 
began to transform their approach 
to these 2 areas.  To ensure that 
health care organizations were 
on board, key quality groups and 
payers created quality measures 
to promote awareness and foster 
organizational commitment to 
the goal of improving patient 
safety and health care quality in 
hospitals across the country.   
The transformation of health 
care requires commitment to a 
common vision of what it can be, 
and a steadfast belief that lasting 
improvement in quality and 
patient safety can be achieved.  
There are still many obstacles to 
overcome and lessons to share.  
As a vehicle for communicating 
lessons learned and best practices, 
Prescriptions for Excellence is one 
way in which Lilly can help move 
this transformation forward.  
As we at Lilly work diligently 
to bring relevant products and 
information to the hospital 
market through the Lilly Hospital 
Group, we look forward to 
partnering with you to improve 
health care and patients’ lives. 
Becki Morison 
Executive Director,
Lilly Hospital Group
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often include educational efforts, 
changing policies, and/or providing 
data.  While such strategies are 
useful, they fail to incorporate one 
of an institution’s most valuable 
resources – staff members whose 
practices and behaviors might 
serve as models.  The term used to 
describe these individuals and their 
practices is Positive Deviance (PD).    
Given that PD individuals have the 
same resources and are part of the 
same work “community,” we wanted 
to know how these PDs managed to 
overcome the common barriers in 
order to achieve the desired outcomes. 
We determined that an answer may 
lie in observing, listening to, and 
learning from these PDs - then 
sharing those things the PDs found 
useful with other staff members.  
The PD4  approach is a process of 
self-discovery that promotes and 
facilitates positive behavior change 
within a work community. Steps 
in the PD process include: 
•	 helping people define the problem
•	 helping the community identify  
 the PDs (ie, the individuals who  
 are already doing the right thing)
•	 learning about the practices,  
 behaviors, and strategies that  
 have enabled PDs to overcome  
 the same barriers faced by  
 everyone in the community.  
 This involves listening to and  
 observing the PDs, and creating  
 a forum wherein the entire  
 “community” can discuss the  
 problem and potential solutions. 
•	 helping the “community” 
 design a method for spreading  
 the PD practices throughout 
 the organization.
Albert Einstein Healthcare 
Network (AEHN) was chosen 
as one of 6 beta sites in a Robert 
Wood Johnson-funded effort to 
eliminate transmission of MRSA by 
applying PD concepts to infection 
control. Six hospital units (the 
medical step-down unit, surgical 
ICU, transplant/oncology medical/
surgical unit, the Drucker Brain 
Injury Unit at Moss Rehabilitation 
Hospital, the medical ICU, and 
a combined general medical/
surgical unit) volunteered as 
pilot “communities” to test this 
new approach, called “SMASH” 
(Stop MRSA Acquisition and 
Spread in our Hospitals).
Unit staff members are encouraged 
to observe, discuss, learn, and 
share with others.  As a result, they 
identify problems, create solutions, 
and identify and learn from PDs.  
A distinctive feature of the PD 
approach is the way in which ideas 
generated by those “touching” 
the patient are rapidly translated 
into actions.  Each week multiple 
groups from our workforce meet 
for brief “Discovery and Action 
Dialogues (DADs).”  Trained 
facilitators capture ideas generated 
by discussions and ask the key 
DAD questions, such as, “What 
does this mean to you?” and, 
“What would it take to make 
that happen here and now?”  
Concrete actions are formulated 
with specific responsibilities.  
Who should be involved in 
the DAD process?  One of the 
few “rules” of the PD process 
is: “Nothing about me without 
me.”  This means that all 
stakeholders must be represented 
in order for DAD participants to 
recommend an action.  We now 
ask ourselves, “Who doesn’t need 
to be involved?” We have begun 
to look beyond the usual suspects 
(ie, nurses and physicians) and 
involve, for example, patient 
transporters, the microbiology 
lab, radiology, physical therapy, 
hospital clergy, and translators.  
Many DAD actions have been 
implemented and, cumulatively, 
we believe the application of these 
PD practices will lead to sustained 
organizational change.  One 
example is the new approach to 
the storage of disposable gowns.  
People entering the isolation 
room of a MRSA patient are 
asked to don disposable gowns.  
Early in the DAD process, lack of 
availability of these gowns at the 
point of entry into these rooms was 
identified as a barrier to consistent 
behavior.  The DAD determined 
that the storage cabinets – opaque 
structures located inside patient 
rooms - were contributing to the 
problem.  A clinician preparing 
to examine a patient in isolation 
might enter the room, open the 
cabinet, find it empty, and have 
to search for a gown elsewhere 
– or, as often happened, become 
frustrated and perform the task 
without donning a gown.  In a 
series of small steps, gowns were 
1) moved from the cabinets inside 
the room to boxes on tables outside 
the room, 2) wrapped individually 
and stacked on those tables, and 
3) stored in clear cabinets on the 
walls outside the room, making 
it easy to check on supply and to 
anticipate the need for restocking.  
AEHN’s pilot units have begun 
to do surveillance cultures during 
patient admission, transfer, and 
discharge.  They receive data about 
MRSA prevalence, transmission, 
and compliance with hand hygiene 
and gown/glove use on a regular
(continued on page 4)
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basis.  Patients identified as being 
colonized with MRSA are flagged 
in the clinical information system 
and placed in contact isolation.  
We have learned that over 20% 
of patients in some of our units 
are colonized with MRSA on 
admission; that multiple prior 
hospitalizations, residence in nursing 
homes, and being on hemodialysis 
are significant risk factors for 
colonization; and that hospital 
transmission is clearly preventable.
The PD process is helping AEHN 
attain its goal of caring for critically 
ill MRSA negative patients 
for many weeks at a time in an 
environment where other patients 
are colonized with MRSA - and 
have those patients remain MRSA 
negative at discharge.  AEHN 
patients are already benefiting 
from the PD practices that the 
workforce community has put 
into action.  Eventually, we will 
achieve the goal of SMASH - 
we will stop MRSA acquisition 
and spread in our hospitals.
Dr. Cohn is Chief Quality Officer 
at Albert Einstein Medical Center 
in Philadelphia, PA.  He can be 
reached at cohnj@einstein.edu.
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Safe By Design
By John Reiling, PhD 
To Err is Human: Building a Safer 
Healthcare System awoke the health 
care industry to the fact that many 
patients die from preventable 
conditions - and many more patients 
experience a preventable adverse 
event.  One in every 30 patients 
admitted to a US hospital suffers from 
a preventable adverse event, and 1 
in every 300 patients admitted to a 
US hospital dies from a preventable 
condition or circumstance.  
Could a hospital facility’s design, 
technology, and equipment affect the 
safety of patients?  Could a hospital 
facility create conditions under 
which caregivers provide safer care?
The Learning Lab Experience
To answer these questions and others, 
SynergyHealth St. Joseph’s Hospital of 
West Bend, WI, convened a National 
Learning Lab in April 2002.  More 
than 100 people attended, the major 
participants being high-level leaders 
from key organizations involved 
in the patient safety movement, 
including:  American Hospital 
Association (AHA), American 
Medical Association (AMA), 
American Pharmaceutical Association 
(APhA), American Society for Quality 
(ASQ), Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI), Institute for Safe 
Medication Practice (ISMP), The 
Joint Commission ( JCAHO), Medical 
Group Management Association 
(MGMA), National Patient Safety 
Foundation (NPSF), Patient Safety 
Institute (PSI), University of 
Minnesota (U of MN), University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UW-Milw), 
Veterans Administration, Midwest 
Patient Safety Center of Inquiry (VA), 
Veterans Healthcare Administration 
(VHA), and Wisconsin Hospital 
Association (WHA).
The multiple presentations that formed 
the background for The Learning 
Lab focused on human error and its 
causes, and James Reason’s theories of 
latent conditions and active failures.  
“To err is human.  Fallibility is an 
inescapable part of the human condition.”1 
“Correct performance and systematic 
errors are two sides of the same coin.”2   
Human error has been studied 
for many years by many different 
professionals. The collective work 
of cognitive psychologists James 
Reason, Jens Rasmussen, and Donald 
Norman forms the basis of a widely 
accepted theory of why humans err.  
This work has inspired environmental 
designs that minimize the occurrence 
of errors and the harm they can 
cause.  Lucian Leape describes this 
as “the pathophysiology of error.”3    
The organizational issues that create 
the conditions for error are called 
latent conditions.  According to 
Reason, “These latent conditions are 
adverse consequences which may lie 
dormant within the system for a long 
time, only becoming evident when they 
combine with other factors to breach 
the system’s defenses.”1  Examples of 
latent conditions are poorly designed 
facilities, including their technology 
and equipment, system design issues, 
training gaps, staff shortages or 
improper staffing patterns, and poor 
safety culture.  These are what Reason 
describes as “blunt end” occurrences.   
Errors made by doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists, and other personnel 
at the point of service are called 
active failures. Reason describes 
these as “sharp end” occurrences, 
5Prescriptions for Excellence in Health Care
and their effects are felt almost 
immediately.1 Examples are incidents 
such as a nurse delivering the 
wrong medication, or a physician 
performing wrong-site surgery.
Latent conditions are present in 
all organizations and are usually 
created by upper management by 
way of their responsibility for design 
systems, staffing, and policies.    
Active failures are committed 
by employees as they interface 
with patients and the systems or 
facilities.  Active failures happen 
one at a time; latent conditions can 
precipitate multiple adverse events.  
Eliminating or minimizing latent 
conditions has a greater impact 
on human error than focusing 
on an individual active failure.  
Hazards are inherent in health care 
as with any complex organization. In 
Managing the Risks of Organizational 
Accidents, James Reason developed a 
model of error reduction.  Defenses 
could include technology, equipment, 
well-designed facilities, systems 
with standardized protocols, or 
human checks of a process. The 
more complicated or linked (tightly 
coupled) the defenses are, the more 
likely the defenses will fail.4 
Multiple defenses exist in most 
health care processes; for example, 
most medication systems have 
multiple checks (eg, physician 
orders, nurse checks, pharmacist 
checks, nurse rechecks).  Potential 
errors that could result in the 
wrong drug being delivered to 
the wrong patient are generally 
caught at one of the checkpoints.  
This method for catching an 
error before it causes harm is 
defined as a “near miss.” 
Errors periodically escape all 
the defense checks, resulting in 
an active failure and/or adverse 
event.  Analysis of active failures 
or adverse events suggests 
that the root causes are latent 
conditions.  Figure 1 shows how 
the various causes of error can 
penetrate defenses and result in 
error.  This model also illustrates 
how decreasing latent conditions 
and active failures would lower 
error rates that lead to harm, thus 
raising the level of patient safety.
 
Patient safety will be enhanced by 
improving human factors through 
facility design that minimizes the 
latent conditions and cognitive 
failures that lead to adverse events.  
This will entail developing a strong 
safety culture, and redesigning 
systems or facilities - including 
their equipment and technology - 
with a focus on either eliminating 
the conditions of cognitive errors 
or helping caregivers correct an 
error before it leads to harm.
Translating Theory into Practice 
The Learning Lab participants 
believed that facilities, with their 
technology and equipment, could 
affect the safety of patients and the 
caregiver’s ability to deliver safe 
care.  They recommended designing 
around specific latent conditions 
and specific active failures with the 
goal of lowering harm to patients by 
creating conditions wherein safe care 
can be delivered.  They recommended 
other nontraditional approaches 
throughout the facility design process 
(Table 1).  Finally, the Learning 
Lab participants recommended 
that the facility design process be 
engineered to enhance or create a 
safety culture that they defined.
(continued on page 6)
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Figure 1. Where Do “the Holes” Come From?
Source: Adapted by John Wreathall, from James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 1997)
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The Learning Lab results are being 
applied in many facilities design 
processes.  To date, the institution 
that has most fully implemented the 
recommendations of the National 
Learning Lab is SynergyHealth St. 
Joseph’s Hospital of West Bend. In 
redesigning their medical/surgical 
room, they applied the design 
process recommendations, taking 
into account latent conditions 
and active failures.  Personnel 
who provide patient care were 
integral to the design process.  
Using mock-ups and Failure Mode 
and Effect Analyses (FMEA), 
they focused on standardization, 
visibility, and prevention of 
medication errors, infections, 
and falls in the room design.
Conclusion
Hospitals can become safer places.  
A focus on safety by design can create 
conditions wherein care is delivered 
safely and patients are harmed less often. 
Dr. Reiling is President and CEO 
of Safe by Design. He can be reached 
at jreiling@safebydesign.net.
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Latent Conditions
• Noise Reduction
• Scalability, Adaptability, Flexibility
• Visibility of Patients to Staff 
• Patients Involved with their Care
• Standardization
•	 Automation Where Possible
• Minimizing Fatigue
• Immediate Accessibility of 
 Information, Close to the 
 Point of Service 
• Minimizing Patient  
 Transfers/Handoffs
Active Failures
• Operative/Post-op 
 Complications/Infections
•	 Inpatient Suicides
• Correct Tube – Correct 
 Connector – Correct
  Hole Placement Events
• Medication Error-Related Events
• Wrong-Site Surgery Events
• Oxygen Cylinder Hazards
• Deaths of Patients in Restraints
• Transfusion-Related Events
• Patient Falls
• MRI Hazards
Safety Design Process Recommendations
• Matrix Development  
 (post Learning Lab)
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
 (FEMA) at each Stage of Design
• Patients/Families Involved in 
 Design Process
• Equipment Planning from Day 1
• Mock-ups from Day 1
• Design for Vulnerable Patients
• Articulation of a Set of  
 Principles for Measurement
• Establishment of a Checklist 
 for Current/Future Design 
 
Safety Culture Recommendations
• Shared Values and Beliefs about  
 Safety Within the Organization
• Always Anticipating Precarious 
 Events
• Informed Employees and 
 Medical Staff
• Culture of Reporting 
• Learning Culture
• Just Culture
• Blame-Free Environment   
 Recognizing Human Fallibility
• Physician Teamwork
• Culture of Continuous  
 Improvement
• Empowering Families to   
 Participate in Care of Patients
• Informed and Active Patients
Table 1. Design Recommendations
Design Recommendations
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Health Center Profile
Baystate Health is a 3-hospital health 
system in Western Massachusetts.  Its 
flagship hospital, Baystate Medical 
Center, is a 650-bed tertiary care 
referral center on the Western Campus 
of Tufts University School of Medicine.  
The medical center has a 1200-member 
medical staff with more than 250 full-
time faculty physicians.  In 2006, the 
medical center had more than 41,000 
admissions and 27,000 surgeries.
Strategic Plan
Ten years ago, Baystate Health 
created a long-term strategic plan 
that has quality and patient safety at 
its core.  The leadership recognized 
that providing the highest quality 
and safest care was the right thing 
to do – for our community and for 
ensuring growth of the institution.  
The Board’s priorities were to build 
a robust quality and patient safety 
improvement infrastructure (Figure 
1) and to form a Quality Committee, 
comprising clinicians and quality 
improvement experts, to oversee 
performance improvement, health care 
quality, and patient safety activities.  
The Performance Improvement 
Council is responsible for operational 
measurement and improvement of all 
service lines. Each service line, in turn, 
has a Performance Improvement Team 
that is co-chaired by an operational 
leader and a physician leader (usually 
the department chairman) and includes 
a performance improvement expert 
and a multidiscipline staff within 
that service line.  These Performance 
Improvement Teams have fixed 
agendas based on specific goals to 
improve effectiveness, patient safety, 
mortality rates, and patient satisfaction. 
Led by a physician vice president with 
other medical staff functioning in 
full- and part-time roles, the Division 
of Healthcare Quality (DHQ) helps 
to align all quality management, 
case management, infection control, 
performance improvement, and 
clinical decision support functions.  
When annual objectives are set for 
health care quality, the DHQ sets 
specific goals to drive change and 
improvement at the medical center.  
 
Personnel at all levels – from full-
time faculty and medical staff to 
senior leaders – must be engaged 
in advancing quality and patient 
safety. Senior leaders in particular 
must understand that the “business 
case for quality” focuses on the 
benefits of quality improvement (eg, 
good reputation, increased service 
volume), but also recognizes that poor 
quality is costly to the health system 
because it increases the likelihood 
of readmissions, complications, and 
untimely death, and is associated with 
longer lengths of stay and higher 
costs. Early on, Baystate’s senior 
leadership supported the strategic plan 
by investing in new ways to reduce 
practice variation and improve quality 
and patient safety. That investment has 
resulted in improvement of the bottom 
line and the system’s reputation.  In 
addition to the quality and safety 
initiatives mentioned, the system 
has improved efficiency by lowering 
1) inpatient and outpatient costs, 2) 
length of stay, and 3) inpatient and 
outpatient pharmacy costs through 
a reduction in practice variation.
(continued on page 8)
Improving Quality and Safety at an Academic Health Center
By Evan M. Benjamin, MD, FACP
Figure 1. Quality Improvement Infrastructure
Quality Improvement Infrastructure
Infection ControlCase Management/Utilization Review
Clinical Decision
Support
Research
Performance Improvement/
Peer Review
BH Board
Performance Improvement Council
BH Board Quality Committee
Division of Healthcare Quality
Medical ManagementQuality Management
Performance Improvement
Service Line Teams
— Adult Medical/Surgical ICU PI Team
— Ambulatory Services PI Team
— Behavioral health Services PI Team
— Cardiac Services PI Team
— Children’s Hospital PI Team
— Emergency Medicine PI Team
— Medical Services PI Team
— Oncology Services PI Team
— Pathology Services PI Team
— Pulmonary Services PI Team
— Radiology Services PI Team
— Surgery/Anesthesia Services PI Team
— Trauma Services PI Team
— Women’s Services PI Team
(continued from page 7)
Strategies for improvement
The 4 major improvement strategies 
that continue to guide Baystate’s quest 
for performance excellence are 1) 
information technology, 2) measurement 
and reporting, 3) organizational change, 
and 4) process redesign and reliability.  
1. Information Technology (IT).  The 
information infrastructure was improved 
to support an electronic medical record 
(EMR) and computerized physician 
order entry (CPOE) system.  This 
robust information infrastructure has 
supported efforts to reduce medical 
errors and practice variation by 
allowing guidelines and order sets to 
be imbedded in the CPOE system, 
providing medical decision support 
in real time, prompting consistent 
choices in health care delivery, and 
enabling the longitudinal data collection 
necessary for understanding care 
outcomes.  IT also supports a non-
punitive safety culture via an online 
safety reporting system that allows 
staff to enter data on all errors and 
“near-misses” in the health system.  
2. Measurement and Reporting.  Process 
and outcomes measurement is essential 
for fostering open discussions about 
quality and patient safety.  The 
performance improvement system uses 
data from all service lines to assess and 
improve care based on best practices 
and benchmarking.  Updated reports 
on processes, mortality, and costs as 
compared to national benchmarks are 
used to drive Baystate’s performance. 
One area of focus has been reducing 
hospital complications and hospital-
acquired infections by targeting the 
prevention of surgical-site infections, 
ventilator-associated pneumonia, 
and bloodstream infections.
3. Organizational change.  Physicians 
and clinicians work in teams that care 
for populations over time.  We have 
begun to teach specific team skills that 
incorporate human factors principles and 
cultural change to improve quality and 
patient safety.  The goal of teamwork 
training is to introduce tools and 
strategies to improve communication 
and teamwork, thereby reducing the 
chance of error and providing safer 
care.  Another important organizational 
change concept is understanding 
safety as a system property. We have 
used the AHRQ Team STEPPS 
curriculum as a foundation for our 
teamwork training (http://www.usuhs.
mil/cerps/TeamSTEPPS.html). 
4. Process Redesign using reliability 
principles.  Reliability can be defined as 
a failure-free operation over time.  The 
Institute of Healthcare Improvement’s 
innovation team has developed a 
failure rate vocabulary to describe 
processes in health care1; for instance, 
•	 10-1 reliability = approximately  
 1 defect per 10 process  
 opportunities. It is generally  
 associated with inconsistent  
 processes that lack human  
 factors principles in their design.  
•	 10-2 reliability = approximately 1  
 defect in 100 opportunities. This  
 reliability designation indicates 
 the use of human factors design 
 principles. 
•	 10-3 or better performance indicates  
 the use of human factors design  
 principles with a specific framework  
 to further mitigate failure.    
 
To achieve truly reliable care of 10-2 
reliability or better, our health care 
system must employ concepts of 
human factors design principles with 
a framework to mitigate failure.
Baystate’s Quality Improvement Process
Areas of opportunity are detected through 
a measurement and benchmarking 
process. Quality action teams (formed 
by Performance Improvement [PI] 
Teams at the medical center) consisting 
of key physician champions review 
processes and work with performance 
improvement experts to help adapt 
and develop evidence-based clinical 
practice guidelines.  The quality action 
teams attempt to redesign processes 
to achieve a 10-2 reliability rating.  
Using improvement tools, PI teams 
measure and track progress, accelerating 
improvement through cycles of the 
Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) processes.  
Recommendations are disseminated 
through mailings, grand rounds, pocket 
cards, and handheld electronic devices 
(eg, PDAs), as well as in the EMR and 
IT infrastructure.  The CPOE is used to 
communicate guidelines and order sets 
for standardizing care.  Finally, Clinical 
Effectiveness Nurses and Hospital Case 
Managers form a “quality safety net,” 
working with physicians to promote 
adherence to best practices guidelines.  
Outcomes
Multiple processes were redesigned 
by adopting reliability principles.  
Standardization of care based on evidence 
has resulted in reduced practice variation, 
increased reliability of processes, and 
improved outcomes.  A newly developed 
quality dashboard (Figure 2) is shared 
with the Board Quality Committee to aid 
in tracking our “big dots” of Effectiveness, 
Mortality, Safety, and Patient Satisfaction.  
The “effectiveness score” is a composite 
score of more than 60 process measures 
throughout the health system, including 
publicly-reported core measures and 
numerous processes in key clinical areas.  
Aggressive benchmarks are used to assure 
performance in the top decile nationally.  
Mortality is tracked by population, by 
service line, and overall.  Risk-adjusted 
mortality rates have remained stable or 
declined in the health system over the past 
10 years.  “Patient safety score” (ie, a roll-
up score of hospital-acquired infections 
and postoperative complications such 
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as venous thromboembolism and 
myocardial infarction) are tracked 
against a national benchmark to gauge 
progress and performance compared 
to peers.  Patient satisfaction is also 
tracked against a national benchmark 
and reported to senior leadership 
on the clinical quality dashboard.
Conclusions
•	 Improving quality and patient  
 safety is the result of strategic  
 planning with a specific vision  
 and investment in infrastructure. 
• The organization must understand  
 the rationale for quality improvement 
 and the business case for quality.  
• An intentional strategy that helps 
 to align numerous departments  
 across the organization is necessary 
 for success.  
• It is important to have a quality  
 improvement infrastructure that  
 combines expertise in improvement 
 methods, knowledge of reliability  
 science, and concepts of the system 
 properties of patient safety.   
• Physicians play a pivotal role  
 as champions and leaders in  
 improving health care quality.  
• A culture of openness is vital  
 to the success of an organization’s  
 quality and safety program.  
• Forums to discuss quality of  
 care and medical errors must  
 exist in the organization. 
• Specific strategies - including IT, 
 a robust measurement system,  
 openness to change, redesign based 
 on human factors, and teamwork - 
 are vital to success.
Dr. Benjamin is Vice President, Chief 
Quality Officer at Baystate Health and
Associate Professor of Medicine at Tufts 
University School of Medicine.  He can 
be reached at: evan.benjamin@bhs.org.
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Figure 2. Quality Dashboard
This quality improvement project was 
an intervention designed to decrease 
radiology turnaround time. Success 
factors included the use of elegant 
technology and frequent public 
feedback to the radiologists until 
the desired results were achieved. 
The radiology group at Christiana Care 
Health System is a private practice 
group consisting of 32 members 
who have an exclusive contract with 
the health network for inpatient 
and outpatient imaging services.  
In 2004, the inpatient radiology 
turnaround time* at Christiana Care 
Health System was excessive.  A 
quality improvement project was 
implemented with the following goals: 
•	 improve radiology report  
 turnaround time
•	 have reports available on patient’s  
 chart in a shorter time period
•	 decrease length of stay 
•	 reduce transcription costs.
Baseline data collected between 
January and April 2004 revealed 
that imaging report turnaround 
time averaged 50 hours. The “gold 
standard” for report turnaround is 
24 hours or less.1  In April 2004, 
only 16% of imaging reports were 
completed in 24 hours or less.  The 
quality improvement team mapped 
the current process flow (Figure 1) 
and determined that the greatest 
opportunity was to shorten the times
(continued on page 10)
Quality Improvement Project to Decrease Inpatient Radiology Turnaround Time:  
Experience at Christiana Care Health System
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with Robert E. Garrett, RT and Stephanie A. Cooper, BS, RT
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between the radiologist reviewing the 
films, dictating the report, editing 
the report, and having the report 
available on the nursing unit. 
Phase 1 – Speech Recognition Software
The first step in redesigning the process 
was purchasing Powerscribe© speech 
recognition software and installing it 
in 2004.  The assumptions were that:
•	 The system will deliver 95%  
 accuracy for speech recognition.
•	 The radiologists will  
 accept the new system.
•	 The radiologists will  
 self-edit their reports.
•	 Adequate workstations  
 will be available.
•	 Speech recognition software  
 will interface with existing   
 network software and hardware.
The radiologists were trained over 
a 2-month period from April to 
May 2004.  The transcriptionists 
were trained to edit rather than 
type reports.  Workstations were 
installed in all film reading areas. 
Increased information technology 
(IT) services support was made 
available, especially during peak 
hours, and several radiology support 
staff were trained to be “super users.”  
By June 2005, 74% of exams were 
completed in 24 hours or less. 
Phase 2 – Picture Archival 
Computer System
The next process improvement was 
the implementation of a picture 
archival computer system (PACS) for 
computerized tomography (CT) and 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
in September 2005. This technology 
allowed images to be viewed at 
individual workstations.  By January 
2006, 78% of exams were completed 
in 24 hours or less; by January 2007, 
88% of exams were completed in 24 
hours or less, performance that was 
maintained through May 2007. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in 
mean radiology report turnaround 
time over the past 3.5 years. Although 
each of the technologies positively 
affected the turnaround time when 
introduced, the greatest decrease 
occurred with the introduction 
of voice recognition software.
An added benefit of this process 
improvement effort was the cost savings 
realized from a reduction in the use of 
transcriptionists. Preimplementation, 
14 full-time transcriptionists were 
employed and an additional $200K 
per year was spent for outsourcing.  
Postimplementation, the number of 
full-time transcriptionists was decreased 
to 5, and outsourcing was unnecessary.  
The transcriptionist’s role changed from 
a transcriber of dictation to an editor of 
transcribed material, resulting in annual 
cost savings of more than $550,000.
During the installation phase, initial 
software problems resulted in the loss 
of some reports, causing frustration 
among the radiologists.  Several 
issues remain unresolved.  Although 
all radiologists have accepted speech 
recognition technology, several resist 
self-editing.  Figure 3 displays this 
bimodal distribution for compliance 
with self-edits among radiologists. 
Transcriptionists continue to be 
employed to do initial reports or edits 
for the noncompliant physicians.
Several radiologists speak with accents 
that cause the voice recognition 
software to misinterpret words. Some 
Figure 1. Process Flow
Figure 2. Report Turnaround Time
Figure 3. Self-Editing Usage 
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Quality Improvement/Patient Safety 
Meetings of Interest in 2008
February 13-15
American Health Quality Association (AHQA): 2008 Annual Meeting and Technical 
Conference, San Francisco, CA 
 http://www.ahqa.org/pub/inside/158_672_2428.cfm
February 20-23
American College of Medical Quality (ACMQ) Annual Meeting presented in 
conjunction with the American College of Preventive Medicine, Austin, TX. 
 http://www.preventiemedicine2008.org/
May 5-7
Quality Institute for Healthcare, American Society for Quality: World Conference 
on Quality and Improvement, Houston, TX. 
 http://www.qihc.asq.org/
May 15-16
National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF): 10th Annual Patient Safety Congress, 
Gaylord Opryland Resort/Convention Center, Nashville, TN 
 http://www.npsf.org/npsfac/
August 24-27
7th Annual Quality Colloquium, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
 http://www.qualitycolloquium.com
September 18-19 
The Joint Commission: Annual Infection Control Conference, Chicago, IL. 
 http://jcrinc.com/26580/
November 20-21
The Joint Commission: National Conference on Patient Safety and Quality. 
Chicago, IL.
 http://jcrinc.com/26580/
December 8-11
20th Annual National Forum on Quality Improvement in Health Care. 
Nashville, TN. 
 http://www/ihi.org/IHI/Programs/ConferencesAndSeminars
radiologists are also reluctant to use 
templates, which could significantly 
reduce the dictation time.
Attempts to resolve these issues include:
•	 retraining voice files for radiologists  
 who continue to have voice 
 recognition difficulties
•	 weekly posting of each radiologist’s  
 use of voice recognition and self-edits 
 in an attempt to use peer pressure to 
 increase use of self-edits
•	 positive reinforcement and continued  
 communication with our radiologists
•	 external pressure from the Radiology 
 Department Chairman to increase 
 the use of templates.
There have been sporadic complaints 
from radiologists and referring 
physicians that radiology reports are 
less accurate with the new system.  To 
address this concern, periodic audits 
are conducted to evaluate the accuracy 
of reports by comparing the results of 
self-edits vs. transcriptionists’ edits.
Dr. Stillman is Professor of Medicine and 
Pediatrics at Jefferson Medical College.  
She serves as Senior Vice President 
for Special Projects and President for 
Health Initiatives at Christiana Care 
Health System, Christiana, DE.  She is 
corresponding author and can be reached 
at pstillman@christianacare.org.
Robert E. Garrett, RT
Administrative Director of Radiology
Christiana Care Health System
Stephanie A. Cooper, BS, RT
Administrative Director, Christiana 
Care Imaging Services
Christiana Care Health System 
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Share Your “Best Practices” with Readers
Have you implemented an innovative quality improvement program at your hospital, health plan, or clinical practice that has had a 
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